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HOW TO DO SURGERY ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF LIBEL
R. George Wright*
I

INTRODUCTION

Of late, the constitutional law of libel has become the focus of increasing
dissatisfaction.1 This dissatisfaction has taken various forms.2 The argument
below, however, is that the most crucial defect of constitutional libel law lies in
the Court’s continuing attempts to draw and utilize distinctions among public
figure and private figure libel plaintiffs. The Court should abandon these
attempts. Instead, the Court should attend, broadly and fundamentally, to the
constitutionally vital distinction between libelous speech that does or does not
address some matter of public interest and concern.
The argument below first emphasizes the constitutional logic underlying the
Court’s initial imposition of First Amendment limitations on the state tort law
of libel.3 The argument then critiques the Court’s initial embrace of a supposedly
fundamental but actually distracting distinction between public and private
figure libel plaintiffs.4 Interestingly, for a brief time, a divided Court returned to
a focus on the underlying logic of putting First Amendment limits on the tort of
libel,5 only to then re-distract itself with a renewed focus on questions of public
and private figure status.6 Perhaps inevitably though, the Court’s emphasis on
public versus private figure status has been qualified, in limited ways, by
recourse to the genuinely basic and more valuable distinction between speech

* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of
Law.
1. For the most authoritative recent occasion, see the broad-ranging concerns briefly
expressed by Justice Gorsuch in Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425–30 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (mem.).
2. For a sense of some of the major concerns, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Rethinking Libel
for the Twenty-First Century, 87 TENN. L. REV. 465, 469–78 (2020).
3. See infra Section II.A.
4. See infra Section II.B.
5. See infra Section II.C.
6. See infra Section II.D.
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that does or does not address some matter of public interest and concern.7
The argument below then catalogs some additional problems inherent in the
Court’s public versus private figure libel plaintiff distinction.8 The argument
then defends the essential priority of a focus on the public interest versus merely
private interest nature of the subject matter of the libel defendant’s speech.9 A
brief, but comprehensive, conclusion then follows.10
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND MISDIRECTION OF DOCTRINE IN THE
MAJOR CASES
A. THE COURT INITIALLY CHOOSES TO FOCUS ON THE STATUS OF PUBLIC
OFFICIALS
Debates over First Amendment limitations on the state tort law of libel were
given momentum in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.11
Famously, the New York Times case held that a public official, however defined,
may not recover damages arising from “a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves[12] that the statement was made[13] with ‘actual
malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard[14]
of whether it was false or not.”15
Defamatory speech not addressing the libel plaintiff’s official governmental
conduct will typically be of reduced public interest. Of course, much speech on
matters of public interest and concern in general will not also address the specific
conduct of any particular public officials engaged in their official conduct. On
the other hand, much speech addressing the official conduct of government
officials, but not all such speech, should qualify as speech on a matter of public
interest and concern.
The partial overlap between the category of speech addressing official
conduct and the category of speech on matters of public interest and concern
may have contributed to the intriguing fact that the Court’s justification of its
rule in New York Times focused largely, and quite sensibly, on the latter rather
than on the former category.16 The logic of the Court’s landmark opinion in New
York Times actually, and again quite rightly, draws more on the value of
discussion of public issues in general than on the value of any critique of the

7. See infra Section II.E.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. A plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere
preponderance of the evidence or else beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 285–86.
13. The Court did not distinguish in this context between the media and nonmedia defendants
in New York Times. See id. at 286.
14. This reckless disregard of the falsity of one’s defamatory claims is to be judged mainly
on a subjective, or state of mind, basis. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
15. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
16. See id. at 269–71.
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conduct of public officials in particular.17
Thus, the Court’s logic in New York Times focused on “[t]he general
proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the
First Amendment.”18 Freedom of speech and of the press “was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.”19 Political change, let alone the broader
category of social change, clearly extends far beyond critique of official conduct.
Even if we focus on political matters, however defined, the express logic of
New York Times clearly transcends the mere criticism of official behavior. The
Court thus declares that “the opportunity for free political discussion to the end
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes
may be obtained by lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system.”20
The logic of New York Times thus clearly extends, on its own explicit terms,
well beyond the presumed value of even inaccurate, “vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”21
The Court’s logic in New York Times specifically embraced our “profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”22 The speech at issue in New York Times
was rightly categorized as “an expression of grievance and protest on one of the
major public issues of our time.”23
The concurring opinion in New York Times of Justices Black and Douglas24
similarly emphasizes the discussion of “public affairs.”25 And the opinion of
Justices Goldberg and Douglas rightly declares, broadly, that “[t]he theory of
our Constitution is that every citizen may speak his mind and every newspaper
express its view on matters of public concern.”26
Justices Goldberg and Douglas thus join their colleagues in focusing broadly
on “public affairs”27 and on “public matters,”28 above and beyond the conduct
of public officials.29 Justices Goldberg and Douglas refer in particular to Justice
Douglas’s extrajudicial declaration that a “main function of the First
Amendment is to ensure ample opportunity for the people to determine and
resolve public issues. Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be
resolved in favor of freedom of expression rather than against it.”30

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 270–71.
Id. at 269.
Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
Id. (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 293–97 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 298–99 (Goldberg & Douglas, JJ., concurring in result).
Id. at 300.
Id. at 302.
See id.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 41 (1958)).
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Doubtless the Court in New York Times decided the case before it and left a
number of important issues outside the scope of its holding. The later cases
addressing those unresolved issues clearly vary in their attention to, and
consistency with, the explicitly cited foundations of New York Times.31 But the
logic of attending crucially to speech on matters of public interest and concern,
rather than to the conduct of either public officials or of public figures outside
the scope of public interest matters, is explicitly acknowledged in New York
Times.32 Attention to protecting speech on matters of public interest and concern,
apart from any distinction between public and private figure libel plaintiffs, is
clear in the case itself.33
The Court’s first occasion to elaborate upon the practical meaning of New
York Times arose in the context of determining who should count or not count
as a “public official” subject to the actual malice rule of New York Times.34 In
Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court acknowledged that it had not determined how far
down in governmental rank or stature a libel plaintiff must be before the
requirement to prove actual malice should no longer apply.35
The Court in Rosenblatt did not attempt to specify with any clarity the
boundaries of the public official category in the libel context.36 The term was
thought to encompass “at the very least . . . those among the hierarchy[37] of
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”38
Rather than attempt to draw any such a line, the Court in Rosenblatt instead
recurred to the explicit logic of New York Times and in particular to the
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issue[s]
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”39 The Rosenblatt Court thus
rightly focused on the “strong interest in debate on public issues.”40
More elaborately, Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion in Rosenblatt41
sharpened the focus on public issues rather than on public official status.42
Justice Douglas began with a crucial focus on the value of “free discussion of

31. See infra Sections II.B–E.
32. See supra notes 18–30 and accompanying text.
33. And thus need not be treated as merely one possible line of further development. See
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 (referring to the Court’s possible “invitation to follow
a dialectic progression from public official to government policy to public policy to matters in the
public domain,” apart from any ranking or priority among these categories.); see also LEE C.
BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 8, 45–46 (1991) (discussing Kalven in this regard).
34. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83 (1966).
35. See id. at 85.
36. Id.
37. It may be possible though for a government official to have no hierarchical superior, but
in an insignificant office, and to fall outside the policy logic of requiring government officials to
show actual malice with respect to criticism of their official performance.
38. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85.
39. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 88–94 (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 89–91.
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public issues.”43 Pointedly, Justice Douglas observed:
If the term ‘public official’ were a constitutional term, we would be stuck
with it and have to give it content. But the term is our own; and so long as
we are fashioning a rule of free discussion of public issues I cannot relate
it only to those who, by the Court’s standard, are deemed to hold public
office.44
More concisely, Justice Douglas sensibly attended instead to “whether a
public issue, not a public official, is involved.”45
Justice Douglas then joined an opinion by Justice Black.46 In a relatively
narrow formulation, Justice Black declared that “the right to criticize a public
agent engaged in public activities . . . should not[] depend upon whether . . . that
agent is arbitrarily labeled a ‘public official.’”47 This, by itself, might suggest
merely that Justice Black was seeking a broad definition of public official,
perhaps to encompass all public school teachers, all police officers, and all
public bureaucrats engaged in public activities. But then, crucially, Justice Black
explicitly expanded his concern to endorse “[a]n unconditional right to say what
one pleases about public affairs” as “the minimum guarantee of the First
Amendment.”48 Once again, the largely superficial attention to questions of
public official status distracts from a more constitutionally valuable focus on
discussion of public affairs or public issues, however such matters are to be
defined.
B. THE COURT THEN UNFORTUNATELY CHOOSES TO FOCUS ON
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIGURE LIBEL PLAINTIFFS
A much more severe and pervasive misvaluation and sheer distraction was
then introduced into the constitutional law of libel by the case of Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts.49 This case extended the New York Times actual malice
rule and other rules regarding public official libel plaintiffs to cases brought by
what the Court referred to as “public figures.”50 In addition to the New York
Times requirements, the Court required public figures who are not also public
officials to make a showing of the libel defendant’s “highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting . . . adhered to by responsible publishers.”51
The Curtis Publishing case could hardly be expected to address, let alone
43. Id. at 89.
44. Id. at 90.
45. Id. at 91. For discussion of Justice Douglas’s opinion on this point, see THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 526 (1970).
46. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 94–100 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
47. Id. at 95.
48. Id.
49. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
50. See id. at 155.
51. Id. This requirement presumes a focus on an institutional press and on recognized
minimum standards of professional journalism practice that is increasingly irrelevant to today’s
emerging social media environment.
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resolve, the various constitutional questions raised by any distinction between
public figure and private figure libel plaintiffs. But the opinion did highlight that
the libel plaintiffs “commanded a substantial amount of independent public
interest at the time of the publications.”52 This formulation, by itself, seems to
suggest a possible difference between what we might call preestablished public
figures and persons who might become a public figure, of one sort or another,
only after or as a result of the defamatory publication and the public reaction
thereto.
The Court in Curtis Publishing then pointed to a possible distinction in what
we might call the source of, or path to, public figure status. Some nonpublic
officials may be public figures as a result of their sufficiently prominent
organizational leadership position.53 Other persons, perhaps without such
organizational status, may have “purposeful[ly]” thrust themselves sufficiently
into the “vortex” of a sufficiently “important public controversy” to qualify as a
public figure.54
Thus, the Curtis Publishing Court’s initial foray into the constitutional
relevance of public figure status actually made the idea of a public issue or
controversy into a necessary element of at least some forms of public figure
status.55 To this extent, the Court’s understanding of the public figure versus
private figure distinction ironically, and quite revealingly, requires and depends
upon incorporating into libel law the idea of a public controversy over some
issue.56
On the Court’s view, public figure status is linked, whether by definition or
as a practical matter, to some sufficient opportunity to meaningfully respond to
the defamatory statements at issue.57 The famous libel plaintiffs in Curtis
Publishing “commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient
access to the means of counterargument to be able ‘to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies’ of the defamatory statements.”58
There is, unfortunately, a difference between the realistic ability to command
public attention in seeking to refute a defamatory statement, and the unlikely
prospect of the truth actually catching up with the lie, in the sense of even
reaching all persons who have somehow been made aware of the defamatory
claim.59 So the law must somehow account for the inescapable gap between an
opportunity for a publicized rebuttal and a full recovery of one’s reputation.
Even apart from building some version of a concern for public issues into its

52. Id. at 154
53. See id. at 154–55.
54. Id. at 155.
55. See id. at 154–55.
56. See id. at 155.
57. See id.
58. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
59. Hence the unfortunate result that the truth and the victim’s reputation are rarely fully
reestablished on a lasting basis. For a sense of the popular-folk appreciation of this point, see A Lie
Can Travel Halfway Around the World While the Truth Is Putting on Its Shoes, QUOTE
INVESTIGATOR, http://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/07/13/truth [https://perma.cc/R5A7-KTBV]
(Nov. 6, 2017).
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theory of public figure status, the Court in Curtis Publishing continued to
explicitly rely on the explanatory and guiding importance of free discussion of
public matters.60 The Court rightly specified, in particular, that freedom of
speech and of the press is designed and intended to prevent “any action of the
government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion
of public matters as seems absolutely essential.”61
C. THE COURT THEN TEMPORARILY FOCUSES ON WHAT CONSTITUTIONALLY
MATTERS MOST
The logic of the Court’s own basic assumptions was, unfortunately only
briefly, brought to the forefront in the case of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.62
In Rosenbloom, a temporarily ascendant Court plurality, led by Justice Brennan,
managed to rightly prioritize the nature or subject of the defamatory speech
rather than the public figure or other status of the libel plaintiff.63 On Justice
Brennan’s view, “[f]reedom of discussion . . . must embrace all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their period.”64
Justice Brennan then declined to take a narrowly governmental, or expressly
political, view of the subjects of public interest and concern.65 Such subjects
should include, as well, “myriad matters of public interest”66 that encompass
“truth, science, morality, and arts in general.”67 And then, crucially, Justice
Brennan inferred that the question of whether the libel plaintiff should count as
a private figure should not take precedence over the need for responsible
discussion of public issues, broadly conceived.68
The logic of this vital recognition led Justice Brennan to then declare the
crucial question to be “whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of
public or general concern.”69 Given especially that “some aspects of the lives of
even the most public [persons] fall outside the area of matters of public or
general concern,”70 a distinction between public and private figure libel
plaintiffs is useful, at most, in shedding light on whether the speech at issue
addresses a matter of public interest or not. Actually, Justice Brennan himself
arguably goes even further in declaring that “[d]rawing a distinction between
‘public’ and ‘private’ figures makes no sense in terms of the First Amendment

60. Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 147, 149–50.
61. Id. at 150 (citation omitted).
62. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion).
63. See id. at 43–44.
64. Id. at 41 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
65. See id. at 42.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967)).
68. See id. at 43–44. For an exceptionally thoughtful similar emphasis at the state level, see
Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. 1999). See also Pack v. Mast,
No. 3:19-CV-501, 2021 WL 411153, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 5, 2021).
69. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44.
70. Id. at 48.
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guarantees.”71
Justice Black’s opinion in Rosenbloom correspondingly declared that “First
Amendment protection extends to all discussion and communication involving
matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons
involved are famous or anonymous.”72 This entirely reasonable approach,
however, was destined for sharp limitation, at least as a general matter.
D. THE COURT THEN RE-DISTRACTS ITSELF BY CHOOSING TO FOCUS ON
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIGURE LIBEL PLAINTIFF STATUS
The Court unfortunately backtracked substantially from the Rosenbloom
plurality view in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.73 In Gertz, Justice Powell appeared
to assume, unnecessarily, that a rule focusing on the presence of a matter of
public interest and concern would inevitably require something like realistic, or
practical, near-immunity from libel judgments whenever the speech addressed
such a matter.74
There is, however, no reason to assume that speech on a public matter must
be protected by any particular test. Focusing on the public interest subject matter
of the speech does not logically require anything like nearly absolute protection,
any version of an actual malice standard, a showing of recklessness, or even of
gross negligence. Nor does an emphasis on subject matter require proof of any
state of mind of the libel defendant by, say, clear and convincing evidence, or
for that matter, by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard or a substantial
preponderance of the evidence standard. All of these matters should be resolved
after attending not only to the value of speech on matters of public interest and
concern but also to the relevant reputational and procedural interests as well.
In any event, Justice Powell in Gertz noted the inevitable conflicts between
“the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in
redressing wrongful injury.”75 Gertz then held that the New York Times actual
malice rule should be limited in certain damages contexts in accordance with a
distinction between public figure and private figure libel plaintiffs.76
The logic of Gertz in this respect is that, in general, public officials and public
figures tend to have more effective self-help remedies against libel than do
private figures.77 Private figure libel victims tend to have less effective media
access in seeking to rebut false and defamatory claims.78 The theory is that
private figures therefore tend to be more vulnerable to defamatory injuries that
they cannot themselves redress.79

71. Id. at 45–46.
72. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring in judgment) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
73. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
74. See id. at 346.
75. Id. at 342.
76. See id. at 343.
77. Id. at 344.
78. See id.
79. Id.
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As well, the Gertz Court endorsed the theory that most public figures have
voluntarily chosen to assume the risk of not only rough-and-tumble critique in
general but also of negligent, and even reckless, defamatory abuse.80 Justice
Powell specifically rejected the alternative of focusing on whether the speech at
issue addressed a matter of public interest.81 Such a focus was mistakenly
thought by Justice Powell to undervalue the reputational interests of private
figure libel plaintiffs.82 And Justice Powell also assumed that the courts should
not be entrusted with the task of distinguishing between speech that is or is not
on a matter of public interest and concern,83 a conclusion that Justice Powell
himself would later largely abandon.84
Of course, Justice Powell’s approach unavoidably requires judicial
determinations, in general and in particular cases, of who should be counted as
a public figure. Even in Gertz itself, Justice Powell recognizes the possible
further distinction between general-purpose public figures and limited-purpose
public figures.85 And then there would be the need to distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary public figures.86 Inescapably, the latter distinction
would, at best, be a matter of degree.
What Justice Powell in Gertz could hardly have imagined, of course, would
be the novel questions of public figure versus private figure status in our own
era of dominant, but fragmented, social media, including viral outbursts that are
both transient and permanently accessible.87
But even as of the time of Gertz, Justice Powell could have better separated
the inquiry into the public or private interest status of the defamatory speech,
and the degree to which such speech should be constitutionally protected. An
emphasis on the importance of speech on matters of public interest, again, does
not by itself imply that such speech should be protected by any particular
standard, let alone by an actual malice standard.88 Nor does a determination that
speech is not on a matter of public interest somehow require, or necessarily
permit, imposing strict liability on even a careful libel defendant.89
After Gertz, the Supreme Court as well as the lower courts have sought to
work through some of the complications resulting from Gertz’s misguided
priorities. Merely for example, the Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone90 determined
that the nationally publicized divorce of one of the nation’s wealthiest couples,
though a “cause celebre,” did not involve a public figure libel plaintiff.91 The
80. See id. at 344–45.
81. Id. at 346.
82. See id. Again, though, a focus on the nature of the libel defendant’s speech does not by
itself dictate any particular weight for any reputational interests at stake.
83. Id.
84. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985)
(plurality opinion).
85. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
86. See id.
87. See infra notes 135–156 and accompanying text.
88. But see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (assuming, without any explanation, the contrary).
89. But see id. (assuming, without any explanation, the contrary).
90. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
91. See id. at 454–55.
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real problem was that, pursuant to Gertz, the Court in Firestone was required to
hold that while this divorce fell within the category of “controversies of interest
to the public,” it somehow did not also fall within the category of a “public
controversy” for purposes of determining public or private figure status.92 The
Court’s vain and unnecessary attempt to distinguish between “controversies of
interest to the public” and “public controversies” relies significantly upon, while
making more unmanageable, the Rosenbloom distinction that Gertz nominally
sought to set aside.93
Soon thereafter, the Court determined that the libel plaintiff’s status as either
a public figure or a private figure should refer to the plaintiff’s status before the
time of the alleged defamation.94 This principle reflects the judgment that a libel
defendant should not be permitted to convert a private figure into a public figure,
thereby invoking an actual malice requirement, by engendering a widespread
interest in the libel plaintiff through fanning the flames of the controversy.95
Thus, the defendant’s publicizing a controversy for which that defendant was
responsible should not affect the relevant libel rules to the plaintiff’s detriment.
Initially, it may seem reasonable to fix the libel plaintiff’s status at the point
before the defamation in question. But matters are, it turns out, actually more
complicated. Not all of the postdefamation controversy and media controversy
will necessarily have been engineered for manipulative purposes by the libel
defendant. Imagine a firestorm of postdefamation media opportunities for the
libel plaintiff along with numerous requests for national-level interviews across
various media. Of course, none of this need be voluntarily sought out by the libel
plaintiff. But on the logic of Gertz and the ensuing cases, why isn’t the plaintiff’s
substantial and appropriately focused media access and attention relevant to
public figure status? By assumption, the plaintiff can now address any
defamatory statement with detailed, continuing, and broad media attention. The
plaintiff’s side of the story can now be fully aired, perhaps to an extent not
available to many previously established public figures or public officials. Why
shouldn’t that matter? Why should the fact that the plaintiff could not have
commanded media access before the defamation96 be more relevant, and indeed
decisive?97
Equally important is the unavoidably underdeveloped distinction between
sufficiently and insufficiently voluntary actions by the eventual libel plaintiff.
Voluntary and involuntary exposure to controversy do not come clearly labeled
as such. The problem of making such determinations for purposes of the public
92. Id. at 454.
93. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
94. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134–35 (1979).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Note in particular Gertz’s focus on the plaintiff’s ability, at relevant times, to command
significant media access and attention so as to meaningfully address and respond to the defamatory
statements. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text; see also William P. Robinson III,
Rachel M. Feit & Katherine M. King, The Tie Goes to the Runner: The Need for Clearer and More
Precise Criteria Regarding the Public Figure in Defamation Law, 42 U. HAW. L. REV. 72, 106–09
(2019) (discussing the standard emphasis on determining public or private figure status based on
the libel plaintiff’s voluntary activities before the libelous statements).
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versus private figure distinction was helpfully illustrated in Wolston v. Reader’s
Digest Ass’n.98
In Wolston, the Court rejected the lower court’s conclusion that the libel
plaintiff Wolston amounted to a limited-purpose public figure.99 The context
involved official investigation into alleged Soviet espionage in the 1940s and
1950s.100 Wolston decided to refuse to appear before a grand jury investigating
such matters, thereby subjecting himself to a contempt citation.101 The district
court accordingly found that by such voluntary refusal to testify, Wolston
“became involved in a controversy of a decidedly public nature in a way that
invited attention and comment, and thereby created in the public an interest in
knowing about his connection with espionage.”102
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the idea that Wolston’s involvement
in an assumedly important public controversy qualified as “voluntary.”103 The
Court instead concluded that while Wolston “voluntarily chose not to appear
before the grand jury, knowing that his action might be attended by publicity,”
this choice was “not decisive on the question of public-figure status.”104 While
Wolston had chosen to defend himself against the contempt charge, he had never
discussed the matter with the press.105 A private figure “is not automatically
transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with
a [newsworthy] matter that attracts public attention.”106
Reasonable minds could differ, certainly, as to whether Wolston’s
involvement in public controversy should be characterized as mostly, or entirely,
voluntary or involuntary.107 But that is hardly the point. Plainly, Wolston’s acts
were not involuntary in the sense of being like a reflexive muscle twitch or
having his arm moved by some external force.108 In this sense, any genuine act
by Wolston would inevitably be voluntary. As used by the Court in determining
public or private figure status, voluntary should instead be interpreted as
something like “sufficiently free or unconstrained” for purposes of the public
versus private figure distinction.
A person may freely, deliberately, and responsibly enter into an area of
controversy, and yet be predictably or unpredictably then “swept up” or “caught
up” by the perhaps uncontrollable emerging course of that controversy. And the

98. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
99. Id. at 166.
100. Id. at 165.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 178 n.33 (D.D.C. 1977),
aff’d, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev’d, 443 U.S. 157 (1979)).
103. See id. at 166.
104. Id. at 167.
105. Id.
106. Id. A contrary approach, the Court indicated, would in effect restore the plurality’s focus
on matters of public interest in Rosenbloom. Id. (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29, 44 (1971)).
107. See Frederick Adrian Siegler, Voluntary and Involuntary, 52 MONIST 268, 268–69 (1968)
(discussing distinct types of involuntariness and voluntariness); Bernard Williams, Voluntary Acts
and Responsible Agents, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–4 (1990) (providing similar information).
108. See Williams, supra note 107, at 1, 4; Siegler, supra note 107, at 271.
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person’s initial entry into that arena may itself reflect varying degrees of
freedom, deliberation, and responsibility.109
It is admittedly possible for someone to be initially swept up or caught up in
a controversy in roughly the way a person sleeping in a mountainside location
might be swept up or caught up in an unpredictable avalanche. But that person’s
subsequent acts to escape the avalanche would then normally be thought of as
voluntary. Yet for many purposes, the person’s attempts to respond to the
avalanche might actually reflect widely varying degrees of freedom,
deliberation, and responsibility, depending upon the circumstances and upon our
reasons for asking about degrees of freedom and constraint.110
In typical cases, the voluntary actions of the libel plaintiff can be
characterized as free, deliberate, and responsible in some respects but not others.
This distinction is thus, inescapably, deeply complex and contestable. It is
certainly possible that a decision to refuse to testify before a grand jury could be
deemed free, deliberate, and responsible despite the high stakes.111 But it is
equally possible to conclude that a person who thus refused to testify was
uncontrollably swept up by events and circumstances, such that the choice to not
testify was insufficiently free, deliberate, and responsible for public figure status
to attach.112 There simply are no authoritative answers in such cases.
The courts thus plainly lack any principled guidance as to how to determine
whether the person’s generally voluntary actions were sufficiently free,
deliberate, and responsible for public figure status. Nor is this at all likely to
change any time soon. The relevant senses of freedom and constraint may well
already bear controversial normative judgments within them113 and, in any
event, are generally indeterminate in legal contexts.114 To the extent that the
public versus private figure distinction depends, as it crucially does, on a
reasonably clear and defensible understanding of “voluntariness,” it must always
and inherently be deeply problematic.
E. THE UNDERLYING LOGIC OF FREE SPEECH AND REPUTATION
UNDERSTANDABLY BEGINS TO REASSERT ITSELF IN LIMITED CONTEXTS
Perhaps not surprisingly, judicial interest in whether the defamatory speech
addresses a matter of public interest and concern enjoyed a very limited
resurgence in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.115 Dun &

109. See Siegler, supra note 107, at 268, 271; Williams, supra note 107, at 8–9. Thus, problems
result from any attempt to emphasize the concept of voluntariness in distinguishing public and
private figures. See, e.g., David A. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759, 785, 812 (2020).
110. See Siegler, supra note 107, at 272–73.
111. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Sometimes, our freest and most authentic
moral acts involve situations in which we feel that we had “no real choice” but to act as we did.
112. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
113. See R. George Wright, Why a Coercion Test is of No Use in Establishment Clause Cases,
41 CUMB. L. REV. 193, 202 (2010).
114. See id. at 224.
115. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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Bradstreet involved what was held to be a private figure libel plaintiff.116 For a
three-Justice plurality, Justice Powell set aside his own earlier view in Gertz that
the courts should not attempt to distinguish matters of public concern from
matters of merely private concern.117 Justice Powell’s opinion instead held that
private figure libel plaintiffs may receive even “presumed and punitive
damages . . . [without] a showing of ‘actual malice’ . . . when the defamatory
statements do not involve matters of public concern.”118
Justice Powell thus validated a judicial concern for matters of public versus
private interest, at least in the limited context of Dun & Bradstreet. The problem,
though, is that his underlying logic in attending to that distinction clearly carries
beyond anything like the circumstances of Dun & Bradstreet. By Justice
Powell’s own logic, a focus on public interest, as distinct from private interest
speech, should be fundamental to the constitutional law of libel.
Thus, Justice Powell resoundingly declared in Dun & Bradstreet that “[t]he
First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’”119 The
Court must ensure that “debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open.”120 More specifically, “not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance.”121 Crucially, “[i]t is speech on ‘matters of public
concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’”122 Justice
Powell then declared that “speech on matters of purely private concern is of less
First Amendment concern.”123
In light of this need to distinguish between speech that is or is not on a matter
of public concern, at least in some contexts, there is then an obvious need for
judicial guidance as to how to draw the distinction in question. And in this
regard, Justice Powell draws upon the more frequently litigated context of
speech-based discipline of public employees.124 The gist of the limited guidance
Justice Powell offers is merely that “[w]hether . . . speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and
context . . . as revealed by the whole record.”125
116. See id. at 753.
117. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
118. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 763. Why such libel plaintiffs must still show at least
negligent disregard for falsity is left undiscussed by the plurality. See id. at 751–63.
119. Id. at 759 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
120. Id. at 762 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
121. Id. at 758.
122. Id. at 758–59 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos.
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
123. Id. at 759 (citation omitted). Justice Powell leaves unclear why libelous speech, or indeed
any other kind of speech, that does not address any matter of any public interest or concern should
receive any distinctive free speech protection at all. See R. George Wright, Cyber Harassment and
the Scope of Freedom of Speech, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 187, 207–08, 208 nn.153–54
(2020) (discussing case split on this issue). While it makes more sense to deny any distinctive free
speech protection to speech that does not implicate any reasons for protecting speech, we can, for
present purposes, accept either approach. See id.
124. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761 (relying on Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
147–48 (1983)).
125. Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48). Whether the idea of speech on a matter of
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Since Dun & Bradstreet, the Court has acknowledged the usefulness of
inquiring into the public versus private interest character of the speech at issue
in other specific libel contexts. Thus, even a private figure libel plaintiff bears
the burden of showing the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements where
a newspaper defendant, and presumably other defendants, addresses a matter of
public concern.126 Here, once again, the Court finds that it must, in some limited
contexts, incorporate a distinction between speech on public versus private
matters into its jurisprudence of public and private figure libel plaintiffs.
The Court has also incorporated explicit attention to the public versus private
interest distinction in a further, less frequently litigated context. The case of
Bartnicki v. Vopper127 involved the broadcast of a cell phone conversation that
had been illegally taped by an unknown person and then forwarded to media
defendants.128 In such a case, the Court held that the obvious privacy interests at
stake129 must be weighed against the core First Amendment value of
appropriately encouraging “the publication of truthful information of public
concern.”130 The Court here neatly cited the classic 1890 Warren and Brandeis
law review article for the principle that “[t]he right of privacy does not prohibit
any publication of matter which is of public or general interest.”131
III. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIGURE LIBEL PLAINTIFFS
The Supreme Court cases that have focused on and attempted to apply
distinctions between the categories of public and private figure libel plaintiffs
have provided only limited judicial guidance.132 The distinction, even at the most
basic level, was “problematic and hotly contested” as of 1984.133 It is fair to say
that the rise of a pervasive, highly fragmented, and largely unprofessionally
curated social media landscape has only multiplied the difficulties of making

public interest should be defined differently in the libel context, as distinct from the publicemployee-discipline context, is left undiscussed. See id. In any event, it is largely true that the
overall majority in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. “provided almost no guidance as to what constitutes a
protected ‘matter of public concern.’” Id. at 786 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens,
JJ., dissenting); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam) (“[T]he
boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined . . . .”).
126. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768–69 (1986).
127. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
128. Id. at 517.
129. See id. at 532–33.
130. Id. at 534.
131. Id. (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 214 (1890)).
132. See, e.g., Erik Walker, Comment, Defamation Law: Public Figures—Who Are They?, 45
BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 955 (1993) (“Lower courts have found little guidance in the few United
States Supreme Court decisions relating to a plaintiff’s public or private figure status.”); see also
Ashley Messenger & Kevin Delaney, In the Future, Will We All Be Limited-Purpose Public
Figures?, 30 COMMC’NS LAW. 4, 4 (2014); Delery H. Perret, An Unforeseen Problem: How Gertz
Failed to Account for Modern Media and What to Do Now, 80 LA. L. REV. 541, 558 (2020); Amy
Kristin Sanders & Holly Miller, Revitalizing Rosenbloom:The Matter of Public Concern Standard
in the Age of the Internet, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 529, 532, 542 (2014).
133. Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 906 (1984).
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even the most basic of such distinctions.134
Merely for example, consider whether the libel plaintiff “Dr. Luke” should be
considered either a general-purpose or a limited-purpose public figure in the
context of a rape allegation brought by a well-known person.135 Dr. Luke “is an
acclaimed music producer and well known in the entertainment industry.”136 He
“has appeared in articles in mainstream media for his contributions to pop music,
his discovery and development of talent, his rise in the music industry and his
talent as both a businessman and music producer.”137
Dr. Luke might, on this basis, seem readily classifiable as some sort of public
figure. But the appellate court majority determined that, despite his high-profile
career within a major segment of popular entertainment, Dr. Luke “is not a
household name”138 and thus not a general-purpose public figure without
more.139 A dissenting opinion, however, adopted an importantly different
standard.140 On that dissenting standard, Dr. Luke “is a household name to those
that matter.”141
There is certainly some logic to discounting the significance of persons who
have never heard of the libel plaintiff, the libel defendant, or any matter in
controversy. But this oddly judgmental dissenting approach could, in focusing
on “those who matter,” logically convert almost anyone, counterintuitively, into
a general-purpose public figure.142
Part of the problem here is that the Court’s attempt to distinguish between

134. For the most recent authoritative challenge to the status of the public figure versus private
figure distinction, see Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (mem.) (“[S]urely this Court should not remove a woman’s right to defend
her reputation in court simply because she accuses a powerful man of rape.”). See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Clarence Thomas Has a Point About Free-Speech Law, TWINCITIES.COM (Feb. 25, 2019,
12:11 AM), https://www.twincities.com/2019/02/25/cass-sunstein-clarence-thomas-has-a-pointabout-free-speech-law/
[https://perma.cc/FLS7-BMZD];
Cristina
Carmody
Tilley,
(Re)Categorizing Defamation, 94 TUL. L. REV. 435, 488, 508 (2020); Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Rethinking Libel for the Twenty-First Century, 87 TENN. L. REV. 465, 477–80 (2020) (discussing
the proposals of Justice Thomas and Professor Sunstein).
135. See Gottwald v. Sebert, 148 N.Y.S.3d 37, 42–43 (1st Dep’t 2021).
136. Id. at 43.
137. Id. at 45.
138. Id. at 43.
139. Id. Note also the recent observation of Justice Gorsuch:
[P]rivate citizens can become “public figures” on social media overnight.
Individuals can be deemed “famous” because of their notoriety in certain channels
of our now-highly segmented media even as they remain unknown in most.
....
Rules intended to ensure a robust debate over actions taken by high public officials
. . . increasingly seem to leave even ordinary Americans without recourse for
grievous defamation.
Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (mem.).
140. See Gottwald, 148 N.Y.S.3d at 48 (Scarpulla, J., dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
142. The dissenting opinion notes that “Dr. Luke has actively sought out publicity,” at least
with regard to his professional status in general. Id. But this, on the dissenting opinion’s own logic,
might amount only to expanding the pool of those media consumers who are deemed to “matter.”
See id.
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general- purpose public figures and private figure libel plaintiffs arose in a much
more homogeneous, less diverse, and less fragmented media landscape than
exists today. Consider, in the extreme, that a 1983 episode of the network
television series M*A*S*H attracted 105.9 million viewers;143 a 1980 episode of
Dallas had 83 million viewers;144 and the 1993 finale of Cheers drew 80.4
million viewers,145 with total populations lower than today. By contrast, the most
popular non-sports network television series programing for 2020–2021
averaged less than 13 million viewers.146 By any measure, a popular media
celebrity is plainly qualitatively and quantitatively different than it was in, say,
1974, when Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. was decided.147
But the contestability of Dr. Luke’s status extends even to whether he should
count as a limited-purpose public figure. Dr. Luke quite clearly, and quite
successfully, “actively sought out publicity”148 in connection with his
professional role. However, it is unclear whether this should matter for limited
public figure libel plaintiff status. After all, Dr. Luke had not, as the majority
determined, also “injected himself into the debate about sexual assault or abuse
of artists in the entertainment industry, which is the subject of the
defamation.”149
This further debate illustrates the problem that the scope of the vortex into
which a party has more or less voluntarily thrust him- or herself, for limited
public figure status, is not self-defining. If one successfully seeks attention, at
least in certain circles, as an athlete in a particular sport, then has one thereby

143. Stacy Conradt, The Ten Most-Watched TV Series Finales Ever, MENTAL FLOSS (Feb. 28,
2010),
www.mentalfloss.com/article/24673/10-most-watched-series-finales-ever
[https://perma.cc/TQ88-BAU9].
144. Millions Tune in to Find Out Who Shot J.R., HIST., www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/millions-tune-in-to-find-out-who-shot-j-r [https://perma.cc/DX53-VHKF] (Nov. 19, 2020).
The 83 million viewers amounted, remarkably, to 76% of the nation’s televisions sets. See id.
145. Conradt, supra note 143.
146. See Michael Schneider, 100 Most-Watched TV Shows of 2020–21: Winners and Losers,
VARIETY (May 25, 2021, 2:08 PM), https://variety.com/2021/tv/news/most-popular-tv-showshighest-rated-2020-2021-season-1234980743/ [https://perma.cc/9N6R-BHPH]. We hereby set
aside the complications of best measuring audiences across various platforms and time of viewing
practices. See id.
147. In 1974, the year in which Gertz was decided, the network television programs All in the
Family, Sanford and Son, Chico and the Man, and The Jeffersons collectively averaged
approximately 20 million viewers per episode, which would at least approach something like a
collectively shared familiarity or cultural frame of reference. See TV Ratings: 1974–1975, CLASSIC
TV HITS, http://www.classictvhits.com/tvratings/1974.htm [https://perma.cc/KD3K-KDZ5]. Note
also that at the time of the alleged defamation of Carol Burnett by the National Enquirer, Burnett’s
network television show had been running for nine consecutive years. See Kara Kovalchik, 16 Fun
Facts About The Carol Burnett Show, MENTAL FLOSS (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/73448/16-ear-tugging-facts-about-carol-burnett-show
[https://perma.cc/F4R8-Z728] (noting that Burnett’s show began in 1967); Robert Lindsey, Carol
Burnett and Enquirer Clash in Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 1981),
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/18/us/carol-burnett-and-enquirer-clash-in-court.html
[https://perma.cc/DQ6Q-592H] (noting that alleged defamation occurred in 1976); see also Burnett
v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 216 (Ct. App. 1983) (highlighting the lower court’s
assumption of Carol Burnett’s public figure status).
148. Gottwald v. Sebert, 148 N.Y.S.3d 37, 49 (1st Dep’t 2021) (Scarpulla, J., dissenting in
part).
149. Id. at 45 (majority opinion).
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become a limited-purpose public figure with respect to any or all of the
preexisting major controversies clearly associated with that sport?150
Let us simply pose the following hypothetical scenario: Suppose Person A
accuses Person B of sexually assaulting her. Now, crucially, let us set aside any
question as to whether the accusation and related discussion addresses a matter
of public interest and concern. On this basis, we must then ask why the outcome
of Person B’s libel suit against Person A should crucially depend on whether
Person B is, in any relevant sense, voluntarily or involuntarily well-known and
thus a public figure of any sort. If genuinely crucial questions of the presence or
absence of speech on matters of public interest and concern are set aside, why
should the law, in this sense, be a respecter of persons?151 Why should Person
B’s fame, or lack thereof, matter in itself?
More generally, celebrity-libel-plaintiff law suffers to the extent that concern
for matters of public interest is backgrounded or ignored. As the libel expert
Professor Rodney Smolla has observed, “[t]he sex life of a rock star may appeal
to our prurient curiosity,”152 but unless some public issue is thereby implicated,
it is hardly clear why traditional libel law principles should be upended in such
a case.
Consider, then, a defamatory statement regarding a person we shall assume
to be a general-purpose public figure. As of a recent survey, the personal Twitter
accounts of noted pop stars Justin Bieber, Katy Perry, Rihanna, Taylor Swift,
Ariana Grande, and Lady Gaga were each followed by at least 80 million
persons.153 Imagine any of these public figures being falsely accused of, say,
drunken behavior at a restaurant.154 Each such public figure would have to show
not merely negligence or objective recklessness in publishing the libel but actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence.155
Now, it well might be that each of the above general-purpose public figures
would indeed have a broader and more easily reached audience for their response
than the accuser would have had for the initial accusation. What is doubtful,
though, is the legal relevance of that fact and of their public figure status.
After all, on the assumptions built into this hypothetical, the celebrity victim’s
response to the libel likely brings the accusation itself to the attention of more

150. More narrowly, consider the determination that a libel plaintiff became a limited-purpose
public figure, thus assuming the risk of false claims, by injecting himself into a public controversy
merely by “boasting about his jet ski modifications and speeds” on a narrowly focused website.
Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
151. See Walter Carrington, Equality Before the Law, 8 VA. L. REG. 481, 481 (1922) (“[T]he
law is no respecter of persons” is presumed to embody an “absolute and indisputable truth[].”); see
also McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 680 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(“There are sound reasons to question whether either the First or Fourteenth Amendment, as
originally understood, encompasses an actual-malice standard for public figures or otherwise
displaces vast swaths of state defamation law.”).
152. Rodney A. Smolla, Core Doctrine Likely to Hold, 22 COMMC’NS LAW. 11, 22 (2004).
153. See
List
of
Most-Followed
Twitter
Accounts,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_most-followed_Twitter_accounts
[https://perma.cc/3AAW-H9PP] (Sept. 25, 2021, 7:30 PM).
154. See Burnett v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208 (Ct. App. 1983).
155. See id. at 216.
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persons than the accuser was able to reach. More fundamentally, though, it is far
from clear how designating the libel plaintiff as a public figure, and on that basis
applying an actual malice requirement, distinctively serves the basic purposes
and values underlying freedom of speech,156 let alone any reputational concerns.
Also, the public versus private figure libel plaintiff distinction is particularly
ill-suited to cases involving some persons who crucially influence important
public issues. Consider in particular the anonymous,157 power-behind-the-throne
influencer who may be decisive in resolving a vital public issue but who remains
behind the scenes and avoids the limelight.158 Such a person may vitally but
unofficially affect a matter of public interest and concern without at all thrusting
him- or herself into the vortex of public controversy.159 If libeled, such a person
would not fit the established criteria for either general or limited public figure
status.160 Once again, the public versus private figure libel plaintiff distinction
is, at best, irrelevant and typically misleading.
IV. DEVELOPING THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: HOW TO BEST
UTILIZE THE CLEARLY CRUCIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIBEL
THAT DOES OR DOES NOT ADDRESS MATTERS OF PUBLIC
INTEREST AND CONCERN
The sheer irrelevance, distraction, and unavoidable unworkabilities of any
distinctions among the various sorts of public and private figure libel plaintiffs
seem clear. In general, the public and private figure libel plaintiff cases
unfortunately have broken loose from the underlying logic of freedom of speech,
if not also from the underlying logic of legitimate privacy concerns. Originally,
the imposition of free speech limits on the state tort law of libel in the New York
Times case “was firmly rooted in the desire to promote discussion about matters
related to self-government.”161 Unfortunately, “as time passed, the Court and
lower courts drifted farther and farther from that objective.”162
Focusing instead on whether the allegedly libelous speech addresses a matter
of public interest and concern would allow the constitutional law of libel to
156. Consider whether an objectively reckless false accusation of drunken behavior in a
restaurant serves the democratic and other free speech values at stake in the New York Times case.
See supra notes 19–20; ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 197 (1991) (discussing the Burnett case); see also Elena Kagan, A Libel Story:
Sullivan Then and Now, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 197, 199, 205–07, 211–12 (1993) (reviewing
LEWIS, supra) (describing the scope of libel law as now extending well beyond the core free speech
purposes). A similar logic should apply even to more serious accusations of criminal or civil
misconduct and to other ethically objectionable behavior, except insofar as such accusations
address matters of public interest and concern.
157. See William M. Krogh, Comment, The Anonymous Public Figure: Influence Without
Notoriety and the Defamation Plaintiff, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 839, 839–40 (2008).
158. See id.
159. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–46 (1974).
161. David A. Anderson, Second Thoughts: A Response to David A. Logan’s Rescuing Our
Democracy by Rethinking New York Times v. Sullivan, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 23, 26 (2021)
(citing David A. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759, 775 (2020)).
162. Id.
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attend, crucially, to the underlying reasons for specially protecting speech in the
first place. Such a shift in focus would require the courts to pay less attention to
the status, or to some sort of legal classification, of the libel plaintiff. While the
crucial focus would thus no longer be on how to characterize the libel plaintiff,
the focus would not then shift to the status of the libel defendant. Instead, the
central inquiry would rightly be into the subject matter of the allegedly
defamatory speech.
It has been suggested that any such inquiry into the subject matter of the
speech would involve uncertainties and impracticalities,163 or an increased
danger to speech and debate on matters relevant to democratic selfgovernment.164 These and related critiques certainly deserve attention, which is
provided in some measure below.
The Court’s own modest guidance in this regard is largely summarized in the
military funeral outdoor protest case of Snyder v. Phelps.165 Snyder’s account
begins with the declaration that “[s]peech deals with matters of public concern
when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.’”166 This formulation, while unfortunately
including the term concern in the very definition of public concern, usefully
suggests an understanding of public concern that clearly exceeds the scope of
the political or of governmental affairs.
Perhaps to elaborate or provide a closely related but alternative understanding
of public concern, the Court in Snyder then referred to “a subject of legitimate
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to
the public.”167 This formulation, too, unhappily imports the very terms to be
defined into the definition, but this formulation more importantly highlights the
possibility of both subjective and objective “interest” in a given matter.
One can be subjectively interested in a matter which is objectively trivial, or
even in what one recognizes and concedes to be trivial. However, it is also
possible to fail to take an interest, subjectively, in a matter of objectively great
importance. A person may concede their lack of subjective interest in an
objectively important matter. Worse though, one might fail to take an interest in
an objectively important matter because, to take the extreme case, one has been
propagandized or brainwashed in that regard.

163. See James C. Mitchell, Rosenbloom’s Ghost: How a Discredited Decision Lives on in
Libel Law, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 427, 427 (2004).
164. See Stephen J. Mattingly, Note, Drawing a Dangerous Line: Why the Public-Concern
Test in the Constitutional Law of Defamation Is Harmful to the First Amendment, and What Courts
Should Do About It, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 739, 739–41 (2009). The specific argument by
Mattingly is that any reliance on the public concern test, in any context, “threatens the First
Amendment’s . . . central aim of protecting speech on issues relevant to self-government.” Id. at
741. There is in particular such a fear “if the government itself were frequently allowed to decide
what speech is relevant to self-government.” Id. at 739. Of course, any such determinations would
typically be made by more or less independent judges rather than by legislators or executive
officials. See id. In any event, and more substantively, it is difficult in the extreme for critics to
condemn speech as both wrong in its politics and as also not political.
165. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). The paradox is typically glaring.
166. Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
167. Id. (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)).
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The Snyder opinion then usefully observes that the “inappropriate or
controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to . . . whether it deals with a
matter of public concern.”168 Also, even the clear falsity of a claim does not
affect whether it addresses a subject of public interest and concern. Whatever
the free speech value of a false statement,169 its falsity does not literally change
the nature of its subject.
The Snyder Court’s elaboration then reiterated the need for a broad
examination of the “content, form, and context”170 of the speech at issue. This
examination should involve taking distinctive account of the broad value of
freedom of expression.171 And finally, when considering the speech’s “content,
form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the
circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and
how it was said.”172
Overall, this official guidance leaves many questions unresolved, if not
entirely unaddressed. Let us, then, consider how to elaborate on the start the
Court has made in addressing the most significant remaining issues.
First, a focus on the subject matter addressed by an instance of speech is
already a dramatic upgrade over any approach that requires any official
assessment, even by independent courts, of the constitutional value of the
instance of speech on its own substantive merits. Particularly in a culture of
mutual distrust, alienation, political self-indulgence, and polarization,173 it is not
difficult to downgrade the value of speech with which one disagrees on the
merits. Such downgrading may be done subconsciously or without any
conscious awareness of bias.174
Far less credible and far less easily rationalized, though, is any claim that
disfavored speech on some public matter is actually not speech that addresses
any public matter. Simply put, one can hardly condemn bad political speech, in
any sense, only to then claim, paradoxically, that it is actually not bad political
speech because it does not address any public issue. Bad political speech
inescapably addresses some aspect of politics, but in some way that is then found
to be objectionable on the merits. By analogy, institutional theologians can
hardly condemn a theological heresy without inescapably judging the heresy to
168. Id. (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987) (public employee speech
discipline case)).
169. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76–77 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974) (1859);
see also R. George Wright, “What Is That Honor?”: Re-Thinking Free Speech in the “Stolen
Valor” Case, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 847, 850 (2013) (discussing the Court’s ambivalence as to the
constitutional value of not merely false, but deliberately lying, speech).
170. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 454; see also Clay Calvert, Public Concern and Outrageous Speech: Testing the
Inconstant Boundaries of IIED and the First Amendment Three Years After Snyder v. Phelps, 17
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 437, 442, 446 (2014); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1819, 1825–26; Mark Strasser, What’s It to You: The First Amendment and Matters
of Public Concern, 77 MO. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (2012) (“The Court must do more than merely say,
‘It depends[]’ . . . .”).
173. See, e.g., KEVIN VALLIER, TRUST IN A POLARIZED AGE 1–4 (2021).
174. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 8
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 407–08 (2013).
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be theological or on some matter of theology, however objectional on its
merits.175 It is technically possible to claim that one’s political opponent is not,
in any sense, talking about politics, but any such paradoxical move would be
transparently strategic.176
Doubtless any legal distinction is subject, by one degree or another, to
manipulation.177 Whether the speech of one’s political, social, or cultural
antagonist is “important,” “legitimate,” “reasonable,” or “dangerous” is, in our
culture, open to irresolvable debate. Nonetheless, the category of speech that
addresses, however briefly, inarticulately, incompetently, or irresponsibly, any
matter of public interest and concern178 is exceptionally resistant to political selfserving manipulation.179
Some real-world cases, however, involve defamatory speech that contains
some elements of speech that do, and others that do not, address some matter of
public interest. In some of those cases, it may be reasonably practical to separate
out the elements of the speech that do, and that do not, address any matter of
public interest. Thus separated, the courts would then apply the relevant aspects
of the substantive law of libel to each element.
More interesting would be a case in which the defamatory speech in some
inseparable respects both does and in other respects does not address a matter of
public concern. The speech in this kind of case cannot be disaggregated or
disentangled into the two separate categories. Doubtless these would be
relatively rare cases. In such cases, the courts can usefully look, by analogy, to
the way courts have addressed cases in which commercial speech is inseparably
intertwined with noncommercial, or broadly political, speech.180
Thus, in cases in which the government seeks to regulate commercial speech
175. See, e.g., Heresy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
176. Imagine the mental gymnastics required to conclude, e.g., that some fascist screed or THE
COMMUNIST MANIFESTO does not address any matter of public interest and concern. See generally
Kahan, supra note 174.
177. Consider the idea of a governmental interest that is deemed “compelling” or a regulation
that either is or is not “narrowly tailored” to its purpose. See, e.g., R. George Wright, The Fourteen
Faces of Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize What They Do, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 167, 169–70,
194–95 (1997).
178. Presumably, the dangerous political speech of one’s opponents should, because of that
presumed danger, be of especially intense public concern.
179. As well, speech that addresses matters of public interest and concern need not do so at
any great length or with any further degree of articulateness. Speech on matters of public interest
may thus be brief and not especially articulate. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971)
(anti-draft jacket display). In general, articulateness and clarity are not required of protected speech.
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(discussing protection of even vaguely expressed ideas of various sorts). And whether this
minimum standard is, in its turn, sufficiently met is a question that can inevitably be asked in the
context of any legal claim, including that of public figure status. Every legal concept involves
questions of its minimally sufficient presence in some cases. Every concept must have some
threshold of applicability.
180. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 677–79 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (per
curiam); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–75 (1989); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C.,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir.
2012); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Ector Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427, 437–38 (5th Cir.
2006); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 260 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 654 (2003), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
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that is inextricably intertwined with political speech, the courts extend the
highest level of free speech protection to the inseparably combined commercial
and political speech.181 In Riley, the Court declared that “we cannot parcel out
the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase.
Such an endeavor would be both artificial and impractical. Therefore, we apply
our test for fully protected expression.”182
Analogous reasoning would suggest that where an item of defamatory speech
addresses matters of public interest while also failing to do so in other
inseparable respects, the speech as an inseparable whole should be treated as
addressing a matter of public interest. And this seems to be the most reasonable
approach, but it includes several stipulations, all with more general implications.
Importantly, the overall distinction between speech that addresses and speech
that does not address a matter of public interest does not itself dictate the precise
constitutional test or level of scrutiny that should apply to either category. The
distinction is, of course, clearly intended to provide substantially stronger
constitutional protection for speech on matters of public interest. However, the
distinction itself does not dictate, precisely, the New York Times test, a general
strict scrutiny standard, or an objective recklessness standard for libel addressing
matters of public interest.
Nor does the distinction as to matters of public versus private interest itself
dictate that regulations of libel not addressing a matter of public interest should
still be bound by, say, the Dun & Bradstreet plurality test,183 by mid-level or
minimum scrutiny, or by no federal constitutional protection at all beyond the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection.
Thus, the distinction between speech addressing and not addressing matters
of public interest in itself leaves open, within sensible limits, a number of other
jurisprudential issues, and this is as it should be. The most crucial problem with
attempts to distinguish between public and private figure libel plaintiffs is not
that they did not implicate, in some fashion, interesting questions of libel law.
Rather, the basic problem with the distinction between public and private
figures, even where reliably drawable, is that it points the law in the wrong
direction. The basic reasons for protecting freedom of speech on broad public
matters simply do not track the plaintiff’s public or private figure status.184
Still, it would be helpful to develop some further sense of how to classify
speech as either addressing or not addressing a matter of public interest and
concern. Many cases, and certainly most of the inherently important cases, will
involve speech that clearly addresses a matter of public interest. Other cases will
clearly fall short of addressing any such matter. Where further guidance would
be most useful is, as common sense would suggest, in the middle-ground or
borderline cases.
One option would be to decide the inevitable middle-ground or close cases on
181. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
182. Id.
183. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–61 (1985);
see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part II.
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more or less strategic but also principled grounds.185 In the middle-ground cases,
the courts should be permitted to promote basic free speech purposes and values,
without violating any clear privacy rights. In particular, courts should be
permitted in this range of close cases to reasonably incentivize speakers to shift
their focus, where entirely feasible and appropriate, in the direction of more
clearly public-interest-related speech, thus converting a borderline case into an
easier one.
On this approach, potential speakers would be judicially encouraged to
consider whether they could—at low cost, in practical terms, and with respect to
their own free speech values and priorities—formulate their allegedly
defamatory speech in some way that more clearly implicates a matter of public
interest. The speaker’s point would not be distorted or suppressed but perhaps
appropriately expanded in its scope and implications.186
Thus, for example, consider the case of defamatory speech that would fall into
some murky middle-ground as neither clearly within nor clearly short of a matter
of public interest. The potential speaker in such a case would be legally
incentivized to consider whether some broader social or political policy
implication follows naturally and undistortedly from the personalized elements
of the speaker’s grievance.
Perhaps the speaker’s objection to the eventual libel plaintiff’s conduct
actually implicates, say, broad nondiscrimination norms. Perhaps the speaker
believes not merely that the eventual libel plaintiff’s behavior toward the speaker
has been objectionable but that such behavior reflects a relevant broader pattern
or practice187 or an institutional culture of which the eventual libel plaintiff is
merely a small part. If so and if the speaker wishes to make that clearly related,
broader, and more socially significant point along with or in support of a more
personalized grievance, the speaker should, in the middle-range of cases, be
reasonably encouraged to do so.188
Finally, it is certainly true that speech, whether defamatory or not, can address
matters of public interest and concern and yet be partly or entirely false and
perhaps deliberately so. The distinction between speech that is or is not on a
matter of public interest does not itself attempt to distinguish between true and
false speech. But, of course, neither do any of the attempts to distinguish

185. See generally R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37
DEPAUL L. REV. 27, 30–31 (1987) (providing background information and further discussion in
various contexts).
186. Where otherwise appropriate, this incentivized broadening of the focus of one’s speech,
for the middle-ground cases, might also tend to increase the audience for the speech in question.
See id. at 31.
187. As suggested in the racial discrimination in employment context by McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973). See also the idea of a “pattern or practice” of
discrimination referred to in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6.
188. For an example from another context, a speaker may wish solely to accuse a celebrity of
raping that speaker, but the speaker as in many “Me Too” cases may also wish to make a clearly
related, broader social point. Consider cases such as McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). The lower courts in McKee unfortunately focused
on the distraction, at best, of whether the speaker McKee should be considered a limited-purpose
public figure, apart from the nature of her speech. See id. at 675–76.
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between public figure and private figure libel plaintiffs. Any broader approach
to libel law must, at some point, somehow address issues of falsity. The
constitutional value, if any, of false statements, and of deliberately false
statements in particular, is in any event currently contested.189
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional law of libel has unfortunately focused crucially on
distracting and misguided inquiries into the various distinctions among public
figure and private figure libel plaintiffs. Equally unfortunate, attempts to reform
and reconfigure the constitutional law of libel have often focused on public
versus private figure libel plaintiff distinctions. The logic of free speech law
itself suggests, instead, a judicial abandonment of this misconceived category.
Attention instead to the distinction between defamatory speech that addresses
and that does not address a matter of public interest and concern, however
reasonably defined, actually tracks the basic reasons for protecting, and for
limiting, freedom of speech in the first place. And this is where the constitutional
law of libel should primarily focus.

189. See generally Wright, “What Is That Honor?”: Re-Thinking Free Speech in the “Stolen
Valor” Case, supra note 169. The classic defense of the social value of at least some forms of false
or mistaken claims on public issues is that of JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 169, at 76–77, 80.
But in an increasingly fragmented culture, the very ideas of truth and falsity can be subject to
critique, subjectivization, and deconstruction. See, e.g., LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH 6, 9–10
(2018). At least on Mill’s classical terms, there remains a sense that some false claims can revitalize
public debate and challenge dogmatically held beliefs in uniquely valuable ways. Perhaps even a
deliberate lie can reveal, uniquely, something of genuine political value about the speaker.
Certainly, some merely negligent falsity in political claims must be tolerated. In any event, we need
take no stand here on the precise legal test to be applied to false speech on a public issue. But it is
certainly difficult to see much constitutionally relevant value in false and defamatory claims that
do not address any matter of public interest.

